COMMENTS
DOES NEWJERSEY'S SOLUTION
TO ITS EDUCATION CRISIS RUN AFOUL
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

John P. Di Tomo*
INTRODUCTION

The crisis facing American schools is well documented. For nearly
thirty years, education reformers have waged war on the states, hoping to bridge the gap between the monies spent on students living in
richer school districts with the amounts spent on their poorer counterparts. The first wave of this battle was fought on federal equal protection grounds. Yet, because wealth is not a suspect classification
and education is not a fundamental right, education reform was not
victorious in the federal courts. Still hopeful, however, proponents
brought the fight to the state courts. They believed that funding inadequacies could be addressed and redressed within a state forum.
New Jersey's schools were not exempted from the educational
plight facing the rest of the nation; the fight continued there as well.
In 1998, after three decades, the NewJersey Supreme Court ended a
battle that began as early as 19701 by finally giving flesh and bone to a
state constitutional provision that provided all children within the
state a right to a "thorough and efficient system of free public
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I See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (finding NewJersey's
system of financing public education unconstitutional); see alsoJennifer Klear, Developments in
State ConstitutionalLaw: 1998, Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998), 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1157,
1157 n.4 (1999) ("Litigation in NewJersey regarding school-funding commenced in 1970 when
the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Newark Chapter, joined Jersey City, and its mayor as plaintiffs
and challenged the Education Clause of the NewJersey State Constitution and the inadequate
educational opportunities afforded students in Newark and Jersey City.").
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schools. 2 Still, theory and practice being inherently distinct, implementing the court's mandate would prove to be difficult.
Recognizing that increased funding alone would not reduce the
education gap, the New Jersey Supreme Court mandated "WholeSchool Reform." Specifically, in a measure of unprecedented judicial
activism,3 the court ordered the state's Department of Education to

mandate and implement preschool educational services for all children in special needs districts. This decision, however, came at a
time when NewJersey could neither afford, nor had the room, to implement the court's new mandate. Faced with little alternative, the
state turned to the private sector.
Whenever the thorny issue arises of whether the public obligations that typically attach to government agencies now apply to private actors, a complicated question must be asked: when do we consider a private entity to be a state actor? While the traditional federal
constitutional analysis has shied away from assigning state-actor status
to private education providers, the unprecedented ways in which the
New Jersey Supreme Court has authorized entwinement between the
state and the private sector demand a fresh look.
In exploring the issues presented above, I will briefly examine the
history of the school funding dilemma in New Jersey and discuss the
seminal case, Abbott v. Burke, and its progeny. Next, by focusing on
the involvement between the existing state regulatory system and the
private preschool providers, I will undertake an important comparative analysis that examines past United States Supreme Court decisions and the current regulatory framework imposed by New Jersey's
Department of Education. This analysis will highlight the stark differences between the levels of state entwinement that produced the traditional state-actor doctrine and the increasing level of regulatory involvement in New Jersey. After exploring the relevant law, I will show
that assigning the private preschool providers with state-actor status is
appropriate. In conclusion, I will raise important questions that need
to be addressed if the State of New Jersey chooses to continue to use
the private sector to fulfill its constitutional obligations.
I. BACKGROUND
For over thirty years, monetary allocations to education have remained one of the most significant items in our nation's combined
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1.
It has been argued that the court's decision in Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998)
("Abbott V'), discussed at length infra Part II, was not only the product of judicial activism, but
also that the holding was so broad as to approach a separation of powers violation. See Klear,
supra note 1, at 1172-74 (examining the court's usurping of legislative powers in Abbott V).
4 710A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998).
2
3
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governments' budgets.' Within the United States, the total expenditures on education by local, state, and federal agencies exceed $380
billion annually. 6 When adjusted to reflect per-pupil spending since
1970, educational expenditures show an increase of nearly 80%.
Thus, if the intrinsic value of a public service is indeed correlated to
the amount spent to produce that good, then one is left with the inevitable conclusion that education is highly valued in the United
States. Yet, this seemingly obvious conclusion is countered by the reality that our public education system is in disrepair.
Educational deficiencies in the United States extend to both infrastructure and programming. Current estimates report that the decay occurring in our existing school buildings could cost approximately $111 billion to repair.8 While this number may seem too large
to be true, an examination of the condition of schools within particular states is even more revealing. In NewJersey, for example, it is estimated that approximately 41% of schools are housed in buildings
that are over fifty years old.9 In poorer districts, as many as thirty-five
schools still use buildings that were constructed in the nineteenth
century.10
These problems do not end with school buildings. In some communities, classrooms utilize textbooks and supplies which are either
out of date or unable to meet current students' needs.1 ' Sadly, it is
not uncommon for teachers to report that they have spent their own
private funds to purchase supplies for the classrooms.
Educational deficiencies extend well beyond infrastructure and
supplies. According to recent studies provided by Ohio's Department of Education, a frighteningly low percentage of their school districts actually deliver efficient educational programs.'3 An estimated
40% of low-income students in our nation's capital drop out of high

5 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 69 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing
national expenditures
on education).
6 Id. (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 166 (1999)).
7 See id. at 69 tbl.4.1 (highlighting that per-pupil spending has
increased from $3796 in
1970 to $6931 in 1998).
8 Kristen Safier, Comment, The Question of a FundamentalRight to a Minimally Adequate Educa-

tion, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 995 (2001) (citing PERCY E. BURRUP ET AL., FINANCING EDUCATION
IN A CLIMATE OF CHANGE, at xv (7th ed. 1999)).
9 Id. at 995 (citing WILLIAM A. FIRESTONE ET AL., FROM CASHBOX
TO CLASSROOM: THE
STRUGGLE FOR FISCAL REFORM AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN NEWJERSEY 141 (1997)).
1o Id. (citing FIRESTONE, supra note 9, at 141).
i See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging
the Supreme
Court'sJurisprudence,26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 953, 965 (1998) (noting that in the largely poor suburb
of Roosevelt, New York, students used outdated materials and inadequate facilities).
12 Id. at 964.
13 See Safier, supra note 8, at 996 (citing Local News (WMUB
88.5 NPR radio broadcast, Feb.
28, 2000) (reporting that only 31 out of a total 607 school districts were operating effectively)).
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school prior to graduation.1 4 In Philadelphia, 40% of low-income
students score below the fifteenth percentile on standardized tests.' 5
This number is as low as 6% for their wealthier counterparts."
International studies also indicate America's continuing failure to
educate its students. By the time the average American student
reaches the eighth grade, chances are he or she will score below the
average level in both math and science as computed by a composite
average of industrialized nations. 7 As these students approach high
school graduation, the gap only widens. 8 In 1994, the United States
Department of Education released a study which revealed that,
among North American and Western European nations, adults in the
United States scored at the lowest literacy level in the three areas

tested. 19
The evidence outlined above only scratches the surface of the underlying difficulties our educational system faces. While solutions to
these problems are not easily found, a recurring question is whether
spending on education is high enough."' To that end, there is an active debate as to whether there exists any correlation between an increase in educational input usages on the front end and the quality of
educational services received on the back end.2 ' Surprisingly, however, studies have indicated that increases in spending on education
So while the question
do not necessarily lead to a better outcome.
will remain open as to whether increased spending is sufficient to
remedy the public school crisis, for purposes of this analysis it is only
necessary to consider the implications posed by the way individual
states fund public education.
14

Lynch, supra note 11, at 960 (citing Richard Lacayo, They'll Vouch for That, TIME, Oct. 27,

1997, at 72, 74).
15 Id. at 961 (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
(1993)).
16 Id. (citing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 15, at 152).

DENTON,

AMERICAN APARTHEID 151

17 See Safier, supra note 8, at 996 (citing THOMAS D. SNYDER, THE DIGEST OF EDUCATION

STATISTICS 1998 (1999). See also id. (citing Duke Helfand, U.S. Math, Science Students Still Trail
Top Ranks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A17 (stating that although fourth graders score above
international averages in math and science, by eighth grade this advantage has slipped in
math)).
18 See id. (citation omitted) (noting that by twelfth grade students score well below international averages in math and science).
19This study compared subjects from the United States, Poland, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden and Germany. BURRUP, supra note 8, at 46-47.
See ROSEN, supra note 5, at 71 ("One of the dominant issues in debates over public education is whether spending on it is high enough.").
21 Input usages are quantitative factors identified to help measure increases in educational
quality.
Some studies have used the following input usages in studying this question:
teacher/pupil ratio, teacher education, teacher experience, teacher salary, and expenditures
per pupil. Id. at 71-72.
22 See id. ( [R]esearch indicates that we cannot predict which schools will be effective
simply
by looking at data on their purchased inputs.").
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Collectively, our country is consistently a top spender on education. 2' However, the estimated $40 billion the federal government
spends on education24 is remarkably small considering it only accounts for only 7% of the total funding generated. 5 The remaining
93% is shared by individual state and local governments. 26 This
spending scheme generates school budgets where per-pupil spending
is indirectly correlated to the host community's local tax base. As any
given community's ability to generate revenues from its citizens' taxable real-estate decreases, so too will the available funding provided
to that particular community's schools. Thus, lying at the heart of
the debate on how to remedy our failing schools is the issue concerning funding discrepancies among individual school districts within
each state.
II. ABBOTT V. BURKE, A BRIEF HISTORY

Nearly thirty years ago, proponents for education reform recognized that discrepancies in school funding were at the heart of education disadvantages in America. 7 School districts located in urban settings typically could not produce the same property tax base as their
rural counterparts. Thus, total per-student funding was directly correlated to where the student lived. 8 It was
this type of spending
early part of the 1970s.'n
scheme that came under attack in the
23 BURRUP, supra note 8, at 46-47.

24 See Robert J. Samuelson, Who Governs? Maybe Nobody, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 21, 2000, at 33 (describing President Clinton's 1996 State of the Union Address announcement that $40.6 billion
were to be delegated to education).
25 Sailer, supra note 8, at 998 (citing Samuelson, supra note
24, at 33).
26 Id. (citing Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to Present,

in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECrIVrES 7, 8 (Helen F. Ladd
et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter EQUITY AND ADEQUACY]).
27 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973)
(describing
appellees' argument that educational expenditures in Texas were insufficient to ensure adequate education).
28 While it is not universally accepted, there is significant
authority that recognizes a causal
correlation between the amount spent on education per student and the quality of that education. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197-99 (Ky. 1989) (noting
that achievement test scores are lower in poorer districts and that "expert opinion clearly established.., a correlation between those scores and the wealth of the district"); Melissa C. Carr &
Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra
note 26, at 136, 152 (indicating that some studies have found a correlation between educational
success and per-student spending); Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's AllJust
a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 549 (1999) (citing Edgewood Independent
SchoolDistrictv. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989), for the assertion that money impacts the
educational opportunities offered to students). But see, ROSEN, supra note 5, at 72 (discussing
the idea of a direct correlation as controversial); Eric A. Hanushek, Measuring Investment in Education, 10J. ECON. PERSP. 9, 13-15 (1996) (arguing that, at best, student performance has maintained constant while education expenditures have increased); Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics
of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1141, 1154-63
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The front line in the school-funding battles was drawn in the
seminal case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.30 It
was in Rodriguez that the first challenges to school funding schemes
were made based on substantive due process claims. Because of the
manner in which the local school districts were funded,"' poorer districts that could not sustain high property taxes had less available
funding for their schools. 32 The plaintiffs, who were representative of

the poorer school districts, argued that treating students differently
based upon where they lived violated the Equal Protection Clauses
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. To sustain this claim, the plaintiffs had the burden of
convincing the Court either that San Antonio's differential treatment
of school children was the effect of discrimination against them as a
suspect class of citizens, or that the right the children were denied
was fundamental in nature. The plaintiffs failed to carry their burden on either point.
The Rodriguez Court was not willing to extend suspect classification to citizens treated differently because of social or economic factors.3 4

Hence, wealth was not considered to be a suspect classifica-

tion.35 Moreover, the Court remained unconvinced that education

(1986) (asserting that the data used to evaluate achievement is questionable and evidence is
either inconclusive or points to a negative correlation); Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance
"Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 423, 424-26 (1991) (arguing that there is
no systematic relationship between expenditures and performance).
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16 (reviewing a challenge to Texas's method of using property
taxes to fund education).
30411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31 In San Antonio, school budgets were predominately generated through local property
taxes and mirrored the description of school funding provided in the background section to
this Comment, supra Part I. SeeRodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6-7 (stating that most money for education came from taxes, including property taxes specifically).
32 During the 1967-68 school year, the plaintiffs' school
district had annual per-pupil expenditures of approximately $356, compared to the $594 per-pupil expenditures provided to
the schools located in the most affluent district in San Antonio. See id. at 11-13.
33 Under traditional constitutional analysis, the Court will apply
two standards of review.
The first is the rational basis test. Under this test, so long as the government can rationally relate its objectives to a legitimate state interest, the action will not be overturned. Id. at 60 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)). The second applicable standard is
heightened scrutiny, where a government action will be overturned unless it is narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling state interest. This test is applied only to suspect classifications or restrictions on fundamental rights. Id. at 61.
34 See id. at 35 (holding that the undisputed importance of education
will not alone cause
the Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a state's social and economic legislation).
5 Id. at 29.
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was a fundamental right,3 and refused to extend heightened scrutiny
to funding discrepancies between a state's school districts.37
Leaving the untested waters of Rodriguez aside,m this decision effectively precluded successful federal challenges to a state's public
school funding scheme based on equal protection claims. Recouping
from their federal losses and hoping to gain ground in a more responsive forum, the plaintiffs' next stage of the school funding battle
was waged in the state courts. It is within this framework that I will
discuss the Abbott decisions. 0
Abbott v. Burke was originally docketed in 1981.40 Poor students
from Camden, East Orange,Jersey City, and Irvington school districts
challenged the Public School Education Act of 197541 as unconstitutionally applied to students living in poor school districts. 42 Simply

stated, the Abbott litigation embarked upon the familiar strategy of attacking the viability of a funding system that was inherently unequal.43
Because New Jersey's constitution provides that every student has a
constitutional right to a "thorough and efficient" education, the gap
created by the United States Supreme Court's failure to imply a fundamental right was bridged by New Jersey's explicit constitutional

See id. at 42 ("The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide
public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible
method of solving them'...." (quotingJefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972))).
37 See id. at 35 ("Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution.").
It has been noted that the Court may not have extended education fundamental right
status, but it did allude to the fact that a complete denial of education may violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Because here we are only interested in funding discrepancies and not total exclusions, I reserve exploration of this issue for
another project.
The Abbott decisions were litigated over a span of two decades. Collectively, these cases
reached the NewJersey Supreme Court on eight separate occasions and are often referred to by
their corresponding Roman numerals. See Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1984), cert. granted,483 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1984), rev'd and transferred,495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985)
("Abbott 1"), appeal after remand, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) ("Abbott IT), enforced, No. 91-C-00150,
1993 WL 379818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 31, 1993), cert. granted,636 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1993),
aff'd, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) ("Abbott I1); 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) ("Abbott IV'), appeal after
remand, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) ("Abbott V), appealfiled, 748 A.2d 82 (NJ. 2000), clarified by,
751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) ("Abbott VT), order clarfied by, 790 A.2d 842 (N.J. 2002), modied, 798
A.2d 602 (N.J. 2002) ("Abbott VI").
40 Abbott, 477 A.2d at 1279 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1 to -52 (West 1975), cited in Abbott I, 477 A.2d at
1279.
42

Abbott I, 477 A.2d at 1279.

43 Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 455; see also Klear, supra note 1, at 1157 (stating that the plaintiffs

claimed the provisions of the 1975 Act created "financial disparities, which denied thorough
and efficient education").
44 NewJersey's constitution pro-ides in relevant part: "The Legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST.
art. VIII, § 4, 1.
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provision. Thus, the groundwork was laid for attacking disparities in
school funding based upon socioeconomic differences.
The Abbott litigation bounced around for many years in several different forums. 5 The questions presented were both difficult and
contentious as the courts and administrative agencies grappled with
the New Jersey constitutional requirement. In essence, a "thorough
and efficient" education would ultimately compel the state to equalize the distribution of educational services while funding these services through a system that unequally generated revenue (i.e. property taxes). It was not until approximately seventeen years after the
first Abbott claim was filed that the New Jersey Supreme Court finalized a redistribution scheme called "Whole-School Reform. 46
Whole-School Reform is a current educational policy adopted by
the State of New Jersey in hopes of remedying discrepancies in student performance found to exist between poorer and more affluent
school districts. The policy is the result of decisions handed down by
the Abbott courts and the responses by both the New Jersey Department of Education ("DOE") and the state legislature to those decisions. To understand the impetus for the current levels of state intervention in the private preschool industry, a look at the development
of Whole-School Reform is necessary.
Beginning with Abbott Il,

4

1

the New Jersey Supreme Court began

to solidify the first stages of Whole-School Reform. Abbott III involved
a successful attack against recently enacted legislation because of its
failure to provide parity in spending between the state's "special
needs districts4 8 and its more affluent ones.4 9 In response, New Jer-

sey's legislature repealed the Quality in Education Act of 1990

45 See supra note 39 (detailing the progression of the Abbott
litigation).
46

Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 457.

47 643 A.2d 575 (N.J.
1994).
48 "Special needs districts," or "Abbott districts," were created by statute. The labels
describe

school districts where a certain percentage of the student population is comprised of people
living below certain poverty guidelines. There are twenty-eight in New Jersey. Abbott II, 643
A.2d at 576; see also Revised Abbott Preschool Educational Program Contract, School Year 20022003 [hereinafter Abbott Preschool Contract] (on file with author) (relying on the Abbott decisions and requiring a school to meet the enhanced standards); Family Outreach Project, Cumberland County, Parents as Teachers Initial Implementation Plan, at 1 (on file with author)
(describing the Cumberland County "Abbott District," which had 24.7% of children and 15.8%
of adults below the poverty level in 1997).
49 In response to the Abbott IIdecision, the New Jersey Legislature had enacted the
Quality
in Education Act of 1990. See Quality Education Act, ch. 52, 1990 N.J. Laws 215 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-1-37 (West 1998) (repealed 1996)). This act purported to establish special
needs districts that allowed for a new system of distribution within the state. A challenge to the
constitutionality of the act was upheld in Abbott III because of the statute's failure in practice to
reach a desired level of parity between special needs districts and affluent ones. 643 A.2d at
576.
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("QEA") 50 and enacted the Comprehensive Education Improvement
and Financing Act ("CEIFA"). 5 ' The predominant contributions of
the CEIFA were to create a standardized curriculum that applied to
all students within the state, enumerate programs that were sufficient
in achieving these goals, and establish funding mechanisms to ensure
adequate delivery of the services. Essentially, the CEIFA defined the
substantive standard of what a thorough and efficient education
should be.52
It was not long before the CEIFA was challenged under grounds
similar to those raised in Abbott III. Again, the plaintiffs argued that3
of parity
the funding models created by the DOE missed its mark
S 54
and that the CEIFA was unconstitutional as applied . The court
agreed with the plaintiffs and, apparently frustrated with the DOE's
failure to adequately implement Abbott IIl's mandate, 5 imposed its
own temporary remedies.
First, because the DOE's funding scheme bore "no demonstrable
relationship to the real needs of the disadvantaged children attending school in the special needs districts,"5 7 the court ordered an immediate increase in per-student funding.5 This would lessen the parity gap between students in special needs districts and those students
located in affluent communities.5
Second, the court found that the statute failed to consider the
need to improve or replace existing school facilities. 6° Therefore, the
court held that "[t] he State must, as part of its obligation under the
0

51

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-1 (repealed 1996).
Ch. 138, 1996 N.J. Laws 466 (codified at N.J. STATANN. §18A:7F-1 to -34 (West 1998)).

52 See id. (indicating that the legislature intends the CEIFA to define "thorough
and efficient").
53 Under Abbott IV, the court held that CEIFA funding provisions failed to
guarantee adequate funding to special needs districts. The courts explained that the DOE's model for providing funding does not take into account the characteristics of the special needs districts. See 693
A.2d 417, 430-31 (N.J. 1997).
54 Id. at 433.
55 The court found:

Not one of the twenty-eight SNDs [Special Needs Districts] conform[ed] with the model
district ....
The fallacy in the use of a hypothetical model school district is that it can furnish
only an aspirational standard. It rests on the unrealistic assumption that, in effectuating
the imperative of a thorough and efficient education, all school districts can be treated
alike and in isolation from the realities of their surrounding environment.
Id. at 430-31. Model districts were hypothetical funding schemes created by the DOE and applied to all districts in an attempt to appropriate school funds. Id. at 426.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 421.
58 Id. at 456.
59 Id. The court found that parity in funding "remain [ed] a relevant and important
element
5
5

in the attempt to assure constitutionally sufficient educational opportunity." Id. at 440. The
increased funding was to be implemented by the 1997-98 school year. Id. at 439.
60 Id. at 437.
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education clause, provide facilities for children in the special needs
districts that will be sufficient to enable those students to achieve the
substantive standards that now define a thorough and efficient education.,,61
The Abbott IV challenge was remanded to the superior court with
the direction to oversee the implementation of the New Jersey Supreme Court's mandates. 2 In a stunning move of judicial activism,
the superior court was authorized by the Abbott IV court to supervise
the implementation of any procedure necessary to provide educational, fiscal, and programmatic remedies consistent with the Abbott
V holding." Furthermore, the DOE's Commissioner was charged
with developing a report assessing tangible factors that would contribute to the delivery of a "thorough and efficient" education.6 4 To
be included in this report was a comprehensive analysis of exactly
what the Commissioner considered to be the "educational capital and
facility needs" of the special needs districts and develop of criteria for
their implementation."
After remand, the New Jersey Supreme
Court issued a due date ofJanuary 20, 1998.'
On that deadline, after reviewing the Commissioner's findings,
the Superior Court of New Jersey adopted the following criteria,
which came to be known as "Whole-School Reform," and now serves
as the court order impetus for unprecedented levels of state intervention within a private industry.
As approved on appeal in Abbott V, the DOE would implement the
following procedures, believed to level the playing field between students in special needs districts and students in non-Abbott districts:
first, full-day kindergarten for five-year-old children;67 second, half-day
preschooling for three- and four-year-olds; 6 and finally, a compre-

61 Id. at 438. This initial mandate provided the predominate impetus for the state's utilization of the private preschool industry. As will be explored in the upcoming paragraphs, the
DOE was neither ready nor capable of building the infrastructure needed to implement the
court's mandate. It is this necessity, that later becomes apparent in Abbott V, which thrusted the
state into partnership with the private sector.
62 Id. at 444.
63 See id. at 444-45 (outlining the superior court's responsibilities).
Id. at 444. The Abbott TV court specifically directed the Commissioner to identify the additional needs of students in special needs districts and "specify the programs required to address
those needs, determine the costs associated with each of the required programs, and set forth
the Commissioner's plan for implementation of the needed programs." Id.
65 Id.
Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450, 483 (N.J. 1998).
67 The Commissioner's report recognized, and the superior court agreed, that
early childhood education was essential for children in Abbott districts. Consequently, full-day kindergarten for all Abbott five-year-olds was recommended for immediate implementation. Id. at 46162.
6 Id. at 462-63.
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hensive summer school program. By providing access to these early
learning opportunities, the DOE believed, and the court accepted,
that access to resources at an early age would help decrease the learning deficiencies found to be inherently attached to students in poor
school districts.70
III. PRIVATIZING A PUBLIC GOOD
Implementing the Abbott V mandate would prove to be difficult.
The court's decision came at a time when the state was faced with
limited options in terms of infrastructure. In addition to these space
limitations, both the court and the DOE recognized that duplicating
existing services was both cost prohibitive and inefficient.7 1 Thus, in
Abbott V the court approved a DOE regulation requiring local school
boards to "contract with... Department of Human Services-licensed
child care provider[s] to provide services to preschool students
[when that provider met certain requirements] .
This regulation
had the effect of placing the constitutional obligation of a "thorough
and efficient"" education squarely on the shoulders of private preschool providers located in special needs districts.
Fulfilling this mandate eventually led to contracts between the local school districts located within the state's special needs districts
and private preschool providers. Typically, these contracts dictated

69 The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs' report that
summer school
"would prevent the learning loss that occurs when school is disrupted for an extended period
and would also provide structure during these unsupervised months." Id. at 468. The Commissioner's report also included the following relevant implementations: school-based health and
social services, an accountability system, and added security. Id. at 466-68.
70 The NewJersey Supreme Court went to great lengths to describe the
differences between
"daycare" and "preschool," the former being a service providing supervision to young children
when their parents are unavailable, and the latter implicating a sophisticated system that provides the educational tools necessary to prepare special need districts' children for success in
advanced grades. See Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82, 87-88 (N.J. 2000). This distinction is paramount because it stresses the importance the state is assigning to the service of providing a preschool education. This distinction necessarily changes the dynamic of what the private providers produce. Care of young children, at least in the Abbott districts, has shifted from daycare
services (a valuable, but not a public, commodity) to preschool, which is a constitutionally required public good.
71 SeeAbbott V, 710 A.2d at 508. During the Abbott TVremand process, both the DOE and the
plaintiffs recognized the usefulness of the preexisting infrastructure provided by existing businesses within the private sector. The court authorized cooperative use of these facilities in Abbott V See id. at 472 ("While awaiting the construction or renovation of the necessary facilities,
the Commissioner should, in order to meet his obligation to begin providing a half day of preschool for three- and four-year-olds in the fall of 1998, make use of trailers, rental space, or cooperative enterprises with the private sector.").
72 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6A, §24-3.3(c)
(2003).
73 N.J. CONST. art. V1II, § 4, 1 1.
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the qualifications for Abbott school teachers, the appropriate curriculum, 5 budgetary allocations, 6 and use of infrastructure." In
short, the partnership created by the Abbott mandate "merges preexisting community daycare centers and district-runprograms into a coherent
unified system drawing upon social service and education funding
streams.",1

Since the 1998 inception of the Abbott program, its effect on the
private preschool industry has become clear. First, the state, by implementing a program required by its constitution, has commandeered the private preschool providers. Second, private providers
must now embrace regulations that mandate infrastructure use, employee qualifications, a standardized curriculum, and considerable
state oversight (including the intrusive and periodic auditing of the
business's financial statements.) Thus, what was once a totally private
system is now replaced by a partnership between the state of New Jersey and the private preschool sector; a necessary partnership that is
charged with providing a public good.
A. TraditionalState-Actor Status
The United States Constitution provides that no citizen may be
treated differently based upon arbitrar7 decisions of the government
or the immutable traits of individuals. ( These protections were initially applied as a protection against actions taken by the federal government. However, with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent Supreme Court decisions,"' the scope of these

74 Any teacher who is employed by an Abbott preschool must be certified and
hold a bachelor's degree from an accredited four-year program. Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82, 109 (N.J.
1998).
75 Any preschool within an Abbott district which hosts a certified DOE program
must com-

ply with a standardized curriculum. See Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 455 (recognizing the goal of reforms as "comprehensive substantive educational programs and standards").
76 In order to qualify for state funding, providers are
required to submit personal business
data, including budgets and financial projections and this data is reviewed by the state. See Letter from Edward Tetelman, Assistant Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Human Services, to Abbott Center Directors (Oct. 10, 2001) (on file with author) (explaining requirements to Abbott center directors).
77 The state requires that class size not exceed a one-to-fifteen teacher-to-student ratio. See
Abbott Preschool Contract, supra note 48, at 2 ("Class size shall not exceed 15 children with one
Appropriately Qualified Teacher and one Appropriately Qualified Teacher Aide .
).
See Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82, 95 (N.J. 2000) (emphasis added).
79 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property,
without due process of law..
").
80 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that state legislation
denying education to individuals based on national origin is unconstitutional); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding that a state law dictating voting qualifications on an
arbitrary basis violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
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protections now provides a barrier against a state's infringement of a
federal constitutional right.
The protections provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to the states are not absolute. In fact, the protections guaranteed only extend to those entities which are direct creatures of the state, and, in some limited circumstances, to private
entities that are assigned "state-actor" status.
The state-actor doctrine as applied today has its roots in three
cases that reached the Supreme Court in the early part of the 1980s. s'
Generally speaking, the Court has been willing to consider a private
entity a state actor in two circumstances. The first attributes stateactor status when the "degree of discretion and independent judgment exercised by the private actor and the standards by which the
actor governs his conduct" 82 are "fairly attributable" 3 to the state. In
the second circumstance, state-actor status will be assigned to a private entity when the close interaction between that entity and the
state creates a "sufficiently close nexus " 4 between the two. A finding
of either of these circumstances is predicated upon four criteria:
public funding, the degree of state regulation, public function, and
the nexus between the private entity and the state. 5
B. PublicFunding
Generally, receiving public funding alone is not sufficient to trigger state-actor status. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, a private school 86 was
sued because of an alleged denial of due process when it terminated
several teachers. The Court concluded that, although the school re-

(1954) (holding that states may not promote race-based segregation in public schools under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
81 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (holding that a nursing home that was subject to state regulation and received state subsidies was not a state actor because it was not subject to the state's "coercive power" or "significant encouragement" to comply with state law);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (holding that, in order for a private action to be fairly attributable to the state, it must be "caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible"); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (holding
that neither dependence on state funding alone nor performing a function which solely serves
the public is indicative of state action).
82 Michael Heise, Public Funds, Private Schools, and the Court: Legal Issues and Policy Consequences, 25 TEX. TECH L. REv. 137, 147 (1993).

ssLugar,457 U.S. at 937.
84 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (quotingJackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
85E.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-42 (using the four factors to conclude that a school in
the business of educating "maladjusted high school students" was not a state actor).
86 The school contracted with the State of Massachusetts to provide services to "maladjusted
high school students." Id. at 832. Once students were identified as troubled, they were referred
to this school by the state agency. Id.
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ceived up to ninety percent of its funding from the state, 7 the discharge of the teachers did not amount to actions by the state."' The
Court reasoned that although the private school's funding was dependent upon strict compliance with state regulations, the discharge
of the teachers was not a result of those regulations.8 9 Interestingly,
the Rendell-Baker decision leaves open the question of what should
happen if the funding was the catalyst to a challenged action. 90
C. State Regulation
The next factor is state regulation. This prong of the Court's
analysis dictates that, in order for state regulations to convert a private entity into a state actor, the state must have "exercised coercive
power or... provided such significant encouragement, either overt
or covert, that the choice [to act] must in law be deemed to be that of
the State."9' Under this approach, the Court seemed to suggest that if
the state regulated a school's curriculum, but had nothing to do with
that school's enrollment policies, then a suit challenging its admissions policy would not trigger state-actor status. Again, the Court
seemed to focus on the exact nature of the state regulation and asked
whether it is the regulation that serves as the impetus for the challenged action.
D. PublicFunction
When a service that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State"92 is provided by a private entity, that entity will be considered a
state actor.9 3 In Rendell-Baker, the Court held that schools that educate "maladjusted high school students" were not state actors because
the service was not traditionally the exclusive province of the state.94
This analysis creates a dichotomy between a private function that
5
serves the public and a public function provided by a private entity.

87
88

Id. at 832.
Id. at 841.

89 Id.
9o Quite apart from the Rendell-Baker distinction would be a scenario where, because
of state

funding, private providers excluded non-Abbott students from their facilities.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 166 (1978)).
92 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
93 Id.
94 Id.

95 CompareJackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (finding that an electric com-

pany was not a state actor), with Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531
U.S. 288, 313 (2001) (holding that a nonprofit athletic association served a "public function"
and was a state actor).
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E. Nexus Between PrivateEntity and the State
The last approach applied in state-actor analysis is the determination of whether a "symbiotic relationship" exists between the private
entity and the state. The analysis under this prong is not clearly articulated. Consider, for example, the dicta in Rendell-Baker, where the
Supreme Court compared the discharging of the teachers at issue in
Rendell-Baker with an earlier case that involved a restaurant located in96
a public parking garage that refused service to African-Americans.
In the latter circumstance, the Court found the relationship to be sufficiently symbiotic because the restaurant was located on public
property and the rent7Paid to the public garage contributed to the
support of the garage.9 Conversely, in Rendell-Baker the education of
maladjusted high school students was not sufficientiy intertwined with
the state's public function of education in general, so no symbiotic
relationship existed. Here, the distinction is not clear. In both circumstances the relationships between the private entity and the public entity were closely linked. Moreover, an argument can be made
that educating any student depends much more on a symbiotic relationship with the state than a restaurant in a public garage. Regardless, these issues do not need to be resolved here; the Court's nexus
analysis indicates a willingness to find state-actor status if confronted
with challenges based upon racial discriminations.
F A Refined Approach
In recent years the Supreme Court has refined its state-actor
analysis; instead of taking a piecemeal approach to the four prongs
listed above, it now will apply a synthesized test.9 In particular, the
Court now seems interested not in assessing whether any individual
prong can in and of itself meet the required threshold, but rather if a
totality of government contacts creates the necessary connection. 99
IV. THE ABBOTIr PRESCHOOLS ARE STATE AcToRs
The measures required under Abbott V and performed by any private preschools within the special needs districts are directly attribut96

See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715

(1961)).
97

See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722-24.

98 In 1991, the Court partially refined the state-actor analysis by applying a totality approach.

See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) (examining the extent to
which the actor relies on governmental benefits, whether action is performing traditional government function and whether injury caused is aggravated by governmental authority to determine state action status).
99 See id.
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able to the state. The educational services that are delivered to the
Abbott preschoolers are governed by very specific contracts that regulate the qualifications for Abbott school teachers, the a W ropriate
curriculum, budgetary allocations, and infrastructure use.
In this
regard, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the private entity and the state. There is little if any discretion and independent
judgment exercised by the private preschools and the standards governing the preschools are almost exclusively controlled by the state.'0 '
This symbiotic relationship has left the private preschool providers with little choice but to participate in the Abbott program. Purely
from a financial point of view, private providers had to contract with
the local school districts. Because the Abbott program guarantees
preschool education free of charge (with the state providing 100% of
the public funding), the Abbott decision has removed a significant
percentage of the private provider's economic base. 0 2 Here, the state
has clearly exercised significant coercive power over the private providers such that their actions as Abbott providers must be attributed
to the state.
After nearly thirty years of litigation, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey handed down a decision that gave flesh and bone to New Jersey's constitutional mandate that the legislature provide for every
0
student a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools."
This mandate has expanded New Jersey's traditional public function
of educating its children to include preschoolers located within the
state's special needs districts. Although the guarantee of this constitutional right is the duty of the state, it is provided through a system
which "merges pre-existing community daycare centers and districtrun programs into a coherent unified system.' 0 4 Therefore, when
this service is delivered to a preschool student attending a private
100See supra notes 74-77

(discussing specific provisions of the contract).
101Again, to enumerate some of the overlap between the state and the Abbott districts, consider that the pre-Abbott curriculum was replaced by the state sponsored curriculum. Strict
guidelines have been adopted regarding teacher certification. The state provides specific direction on infrastructure use and resource allocations including the hours of operation the school
needs to provide its services to the children. The state requires each facility to employ certain
personnel including a nurse and family worker. Routine monitoring and systematic program
assessments by the state occurs on a regular basis. And finally, both class size and teacher-tostudent ratios are set by the state.
102In one particular preschool located within the Vineland School District, Abbott funding
now represents approximately 60%-70% of the school's available income. In addition, preschools that had traditionally hosted kindergarten programs have had to shut those programs
down because of their inability to compete with the public sector's now free full-day programs.
Phone Interview with John V. Di Tomo, Business Administrator, My Little Friends Preschool
(Oct. 1, 2003) ("Since the inception of Abbott's full-day kindergarten, the need for a private
full-day kindergarten has vanished.").
103 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4,
1.
104 SeeAbbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82, 95
(N.J. 2000).
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Abbott preschool, that student's constitutional right, as guaranteed
by the state, is being delivered by a private entity. It is therefore appropriate to recognize that the private preschools in this circumstance are performing a function that is traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state and that the private Abbott providers
are thus state actors.105
V.

RAMIFICATIONS

Because there is little if any distinction between the private Abbott
schools and other public schools within the special needs districts,
"an area of individual freedom.., limiting the reach of federal law"
has been removed.1 6 As state actors, both the local school districts
and the private schools must recognize the ramifications that their
combined actions may have on the individual rights and liberties of
both the children and staff. Furthermore, the local school districts
need to recognize that most, if not all, of the private Abbott preschools are not in a position to defend a costly litigation should a suit
be filed for violations of the Federal Constitution. Thus, the realities
of this imposed constitutional status must be considered when the local school boards contract with the private schools.
On the surface, theoretical issues may arise due to this new stateactor status. Consider questions from an employment perspective:
are federal procedural safeguards now required in hiring and firing
practices? Will federal procedural due process attach to employee
disciplinary measures? Is an employment contract with a private Abbott preschool a federally protected property right?
Aside from the realm of employment, what issues may arise from
the implications of the First Amendment? Can an administrator of
an Abbott school remove books from the library simply because she
no longer approves of their content? What if a private school, prior
to Abbott, had incorporated a particular degree of religious education
into its curriculum? Is continued use of such material permitted?
These questions, of course, are simply conjecture. At first glance,
they may even appear to be silly. After all, aren't these just three- and
four-year-old children? Yet, the state of New Jersey has guaranteed
these children a state constitutional right. And if the premise of Abbott is correct-that the effect of early intervention leads to better
prepared students-then these questions take on significant import.

105 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (finding that
to be a state actor a
school must be performing a service that is traditionally a state function); see also Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (discussing whether state-actor status should attach when private action is caused by the exercise of a right created by the state).
106 Lugar, 457 U.S.
at 936.
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Still, it is unlikely that the Federal Constitution will reach any of these
issues unless litigation is spun from the same thread as the state's influence over the private Abbott schools. 0 7 This of course asks the
question of whether there are any actual practices within any special
needs districts that may offend the Federal Constitution.
Using the Vineland City School District as an example,'08 consider
the ramifications of recent policy. In the 2002-2003 school contracts
between the school district and the private Abbott providers, the private providers were required to submit to the district the number of
spots that would be available for Abbott students that year.' °9 Once
these numbers were received and approved, the district required the
centers to leave open twenty percent of those seats to be assigned by
the district itself."' The reason for this quota was that the district
wanted to ensure diversity in the preschool classrooms.'
This contractual provision is troubling indeed. The Supreme
Court has held that "[p]referring members of any one group for no
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own
sake."' 2 Thus any state regulation that creates a set-aside for any
"specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race
3
or ethnic origin... must be facially invalid.""
It is well settled that in the context of an equal protection claim,
to withstand a strict scrutiny analysis, a respondent must demonstrate
that the use of a suspect classification in its program (i.e., a twenty
percent set-aside) employs narrowly tailored measures that further
Indeed, here we have an excompelling governmental interests.

107

See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing how state-actor status does not at-

tach to an action by the private entity unless such action is directly connected with the state's
influence over that private entity).
108 Vineland is one of the twenty-eight special needs districts identified by the Abbott decision.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 412-14 (N.J. 1990).
109 Interview with Helen A. Di Tomo, Director, My Little Friends Preschool, in Philadelphia,
Pa. (Mar. 8, 2003). See also, Abbott Preschool Contract, supra note 48, at 6-7 ("Twenty percent.., of the slots shall be filled by [the district]. In the event that a [private preschool] is
unable to designate eighty percent (80%) of the student slots from its enrollment list, [the
").
school district will] assign any remaining slots .
10 Abbott Preschool Contract, supra note 48, at 6-7; see also Letter from Robert A. De Santo,
City of Vineland Solicitor, to Vineland Abbott Preschool Providers (Aug. 12, 2003) (on file with
author) ("The district has a fundamental goal of achieving equity and non-discrimination in the
placements and in order to secure that goal, is requiring the right to place 20% of the students.").
i Letter from Robert A. De Santo, City of Vineland Solicitor, to Vineland Abbott Preschool
Providers (Aug. 12, 2003) (on file with author).
11 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)
(citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 397 U.S. 194, 196 (1964); and Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
113 Id.
"14 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411,
2427 (2003).
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ample of an action of the state that may come directly to bear on the
shoulders of the private Abbott providers.
In Vineland City, preschool children that participate in the Abbott
program register for enrollment with the local school districts or with
the individual providers themselves." 5 There are no admission requirements for children to attend the school, and all children within
the district have a right to participate in the program. Under this system, it is conceivable that the location of a school acts as the predominant factor influencing where a child will attend school. Nevertheless, schools do offer unique situations that may provide
competitive advantages over other schools. For example, teachers at
one school may have a unique reputation that parents desire, or one
school may have better facilities than others within the district. Regardless, an argument can be made that one school may offer a more
advantageous opportunity for children than others schools. This advantage may be deprived if one student is unable to register at a particular school because the district's set-aside has foreclosed available
seating to students who otherwise wished to attend a particular
school. On this premise, has the state violated this student's equal
protection rights?
This question posed turns largely on what role diversity should
play within a preschool setting. Do children at the age of three or
four know what race is? The answer to this question is not clear. We
know that diversity in higher education is a compelling interest of the
state." 6 Studies have also considered the impact of diversity on children participating in early intervention programs and have determined that children do benefit from diversity in the classroom." 7 Yet
is a twenty percent set-aside a narrowly tailored response? Because of
Gratz v. Bollinger, we know that the Supreme Court will not permit
academic institutions to implement programs that blindly consider
race as the sole classification for student enrollment."" Since Abbott
students in general are not assigned to preschools by any predetermined criteria, the twenty percent set-aside introduces race as the

15 Children that rely on public transportation
to and from the Abbott schools must enroll
with the district and are not free to choose which Abbott school they attend.
116See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (declaring that a diverse student body is a constitutional goal

for a public college); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (discussing educational
goals in using racial classifications could be legitimately served by the competitive consideration
of race).
117 See NATIONAL

ACADEMIES

PRESS, CULTURAL

DIVERSITY AND EARLY EDUCATION

8, at

http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/earlyed/contents.html ("All children can benefit
from exposure to multilingual and multicultural learning environments.").
18 See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428 (holding that when race is used as the decisive factor in school
enrollment to the extent that all other considerations are removed that system violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution).
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only admissions consideration and therefore seems to violate the
Constitution.
One other justification can permit this set-aside: the action being
a narrowly tailored response necessary to remedy past discrimination.
Again, it appears that it is not. First, the Abbott program itself is a
relatively recent creation of the state. Therefore, discrimination
within the Abbott program itself seems unlikely and without an instance of specific past discriminatory practices the state is without justification for the set-aside. 1 9
In further support that this provision cannot be rationally related
to attempts at remedying past discrimination consider the fact that
the Abbott decision itself was predicated upon the reality that the special needs districts had concentrated minority populations. 2 0 If the
Abbott program in its creation was adopted in part to address the
needs of a disproportionably large minority population, 2' it becomes
difficult to rationalize the set-aside in terms of remedying past discrimination.
The New Jersey courts have on numerous occasions stated that it
is the policy of the state to prohibit discrimination and segregation in
its public schools. This policy is considered as important to the state
as providing a thorough and efficient education. 1 Yet, it is unclear
what discrimination the local districts are remedying by the twenty
percent set-aside. Furthermore, quotas are not permitted to be used
in educational settings even when the purpose of the quota is to ensure diversity in the classroom. Because this quota is not narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling interest of the state, it runs afoul of
the United States Constitution.
-

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to explore the possible ramifications that occur
when a state merges a private sector into a cooperative enterprise
charged with fulfilling a state's constitutional mandate. Undoubtedly, unique challenges are presented by this analysis-both real and
conjectural. The ultimate goal, however, is to urge cautious and
thoughtful consideration when the local school districts contract with

119

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a state does

not have the degree of discretion that is attributed to Congress when remedying effects of historical discrimination and attempts by the state to provide such a remedy must be tailored to
specific instances of past discrimination).
12
Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 433 (N.J. 1997).
121 See id. (taking judicial notice that on aggregate the
state's special needs districts were 47%
black, 33.5% Latino, and 15.4% white).
122 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs, v. Bd. of Educ. of Englewood, 788 A.2d 729, 742
(N.J. 2002) (stating above proposition).
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private preschool providers. Provisions within these contracts should
serve necessary ends, but short-sighted provisions potentially subject
the private providers to costly and unnecessary litigation. The Abbott
decisions embodied the concept of a partnership between the local
school boards and the private providers. In good faith, these parties
should contract to effectuate the ends mandated by Abbott, keeping
an eye on the constitutional status Abbott places on private preschools.

